Here are some ideas, courtesy of Professors McElhaney and Mauet, on effectively cross-examining your opponent’s expert witness at trial.

1. Make Him or Her Your Own Expert. Professor McElhaney suggests you look for places where your opponent’s expert agrees with your theories in the case. For example, if, in a personal injury case, both experts mostly agree on the severity of the damages and future treatment, but differ on causation, focus on where there is agreement. He says:

“Note that the defendant’s own doctor admits that the plaintiff will be subject to sudden seizures for the rest of his life; that this form of epilepsy can only be treated, not cured; and that the plaintiff’s condition can put him out of work as a machinist and means he can never drive again.

If you have a strong case on causation, you may decide it is better to make this witness your own on the issue of damages than to try to beat him down on the subject of cause.” (Litigation (ABA 1995) 165.)

2. Attack His or Her Qualifications. “No matter how well-qualified the witness,” McElhaney reminds us, “there is always a higher level he has not reached.” (Id.) Used subtly, this can also serve to bolster your expert’s credibility if he/she has better credentials.

3. Narrow His or Her Expertise. Professor Mauet  points out that, “[o]ften an expert will appear to be highly qualified, yet his actual expertise and experience are in areas different from those involved in the case. The cross-examination technique is to build up the witness’ real expertise, then show that this particular expertise is not directly applicable to the type of case on trial.” (Fundamentals of Trial Techniques (3rd Ed. 1992) at 266.)

4. Attack His or Her Facts. I see two possibilities here. One is if you can establish an opinion rests on a faulty or controversial factual premise, such as a date, measurement or time. The other, highlighted by McElhaney, capitalizes on the fact the expert did not do factual investigation himself, but is relying instead on the reports of others. He gives an example of an effective examination:

“Q. Doctor, can we agree that your opinion can be no better than the information on which it is based?

A. Well, yes, I guess so.

Q. If the information you have is not accurate, then the opinion would have to suffer too?

A. Of course.

Q. Which is why you would rather gather the information yourself than have to trust some source you have not worked with before?

A. Absolutely.

Q. But you were not given an opportunity to do that in this case?

A. Well, not exactly. No, I wasn’t.” (Litigation, 167.)

5. Vary The Hypothetical. McElhaney explains this approach as follows:

“You are permitted to change the facts around to see at which point they alter the expert’s opinion — depending on whether the question on direct examination originally was asked as a hypothetical.

You can insert facts you feel were left out on direct, or take out facts you feel should not have been included.” (Id.)

Let me go on record here that I view this as an advanced technique, and an opportunity to ruin an otherwise solid cross-examination. Ideally, you would have covered this ground with the witness in a pre-trial deposition, so you know what the answer should be and can hold the witness accountable if he/she strays. Otherwise, an experienced expert might hand you your head on a stick if you are not meticulously prepared.

6. Use The Expert To Bolster Your Own Credibility. Mauet suggest it can be “useful to cross-examine an expert to establish your own expertise in the subject. You can do this by defining technical terms or describing technical procedures and having the expert agree that you have defined or described them correctly. Use a treatise to obtain accurate definitions and descriptions. If this expert disagrees, you can impeach him with the treatises.” (Fundamentals, 267.)

7. Establish His or Her Compensation Bias. Mauet writes: “Inquire into professional fees charged and whether they have already been paid.” But he reminds us to “[k]eep in mind . . . that trials are a two-way street. Your opponent can do to you what you contemplate doing to him. Before pursuing this approach, make sure your own experts are less vulnerable than your opponent’s.” (Id., 266.)

8. Identify Additional Steps The Expert Did not Take. Mauet suggests we “[d]emonstrate that the witness did not do all the things a thorough, careful expert should have done. Demonstrate that a variety of tests could and should have been performed to arrive at a reliable opinion in this case.” (Id., 267-68.)

There. Now go get ’em.

This cautionary tale comes from a case called Mt. Holyoke Homes, L.P., v. Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, LLP (No. B243912). The facts are straightforward. Mt. Holyoke Homes hired Los Angeles law firm Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell to provide legal services in connection with a real estate development.

When lawyers at the Jeffer firm failed to timely challenge the California Coastal Commission’s exercise of jurisdiction over Mt. Holyoke’s application for a development permit, Mt. Holyoke sued the firm for legal malpractice. Jeffer Mangels petitioned to compel arbitration, which was required under its engagement agreement with Mt. Holyoke. The law firm also sought to recover unpaid legal fees.

The parties jointly selected Retired Judge Eli Chernow to serve as the arbitrator over the malpractice action. According to the case, Judge Chernow made the following disclosures at the outset of his engagement:

“Judge Chernow disclosed that Defendants’ counsel had represented a party to a mediation before him within the past five years, but stated that he was not aware of any relationship with any party or attorney involved in this matter that would impair his ability to act fairly and impartially. Judge Chernow later disclosed that he had known Benjamin Reznik for many years. He also disclosed that he had conducted an arbitration and a mediation involving Adler more than five years earlier. The parties agreed to his appointment as arbitrator despite these disclosures.”

Judge Chernow ultimately issued an award in Jeffer Mangels’ favor on the grounds that its members had not breached the applicable standard of care nor caused Mt. Holyoke’s damages. He awarded the law firm $18,132.81 in unpaid legal fees, $285,000 in attorney fees incurred in connection with the arbitration, and over $150,000 in costs.

Smelling a rat, one of the Mt. Holyoke plaintiffs scoured the internet looking for evidence of bias on the part of the arbitrator. According to the case:

“She discovered for the first time a previously undisclosed resume in which Judge Chernow had named Robert Mangels, a name partner in JMBM, as a reference. She found a link to the resume on the Internet site of the National Academy of Distinguished Neutrals. Mangels was the first of three “References” listed on the resume.”

Reasonable minds will differ on whether this was really smoking gun evidence of bias. Judge Chernow signed a declaration attesting to the fact that the “resume” had been prepared 10 years earlier and that “he had listed Mangels as a reference only because Mangels was a well-known and highly-regarded litigator who was familiar with his abilities as a neutral.”

The trial court, unimpressed with the internet revelations, granted Jeffer’s petition to confirm the arbitration award and denied Mt. Holyoke’s petition to vacate the award. But—you guessed it—Mt. Holyoke appealed, and the California Court of Appeal held that it was error for the trial court to deny the petition to vacate the award based on the revelations of Judge Chernow’s . . . er . . . sordid past with Robert Mangles. The Court said:

“ . . . the connection between the undisclosed fact of the arbitrator’s naming an attorney as a reference on his resume and the subject matter of the arbitration, a legal malpractice action against the law firm in which the same attorney is a partner, is sufficiently close that a person reasonably could entertain a doubt that the arbitrator could be impartial. We conclude that Judge Chernow was required to disclose the fact that he had listed Mangels as a reference on his resume. Judge Chernow did not state in his declaration that at the time of his required disclosures he was not aware that he had listed Mangels as a reference on his resume, and there appears to be no reasonable dispute that he was aware of that fact at that time. His failure to timely disclose this ground for disqualification of which he was then aware compels the vacation of the arbitrator’s award.”

The real loser here is Jeffer Mangels or its malpractice carrier, who now have to re-try and, presumably, re-win the malpractice case. Perhaps there really was bias, though I doubt it. Judge Chernow is a pretty well-respected neutral. However, this case highlights the risks if you don’t know your arbitrator really, really well (or if you actually do know your arbitrator really, really well). I never said arbitration wasn’t risky, expensive and unpredictable.